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1 Introduction
This paper examines the long-term effect of importing intermediate inputs on firm performance
and quantitatively evaluate the relative importance of its effect through immediately increased
revenue and dynamically increased productivity, by estimating a dynamic model of endogenous
importing decisions at the firm level with random sunk and fixed costs of importing. The idea
of this paper is motivated by two basic facts observed in a plant-level panel data from Colombia.
First, firms that are importing intermediate inputs have much higher labor productivity than
those not. Second, firms’ labor productivity jumps up when they start importing and jumps
down when they stop importing. Both of these two facts suggest labor productivity is positively
correlated with importing behavior. This is consistent with existing literatures in international
trade, which document a strong and positive correlation between productivity and importing. For
example, using cross-country macro data, it is shown that countries more actively participating
in importing have higher productivity levels and productivity growth rates (Coe and Helpman,
1995; Coe et al., 1997; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Acharya and Keller, 2009) 1. Keller (2004) has a
review of the literature before 2004. Using recently available firm- or plant-level data it is shown
that firm-level productivity are positively related to firms’ importing behavior (Halpern et al.,
2011; Bernard et al., 2009; Blalock and Veloso, 2007; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Kasahara and
Rodrigue, 2008; Vogel and Wagner, 2010; Khandelwal and Topalova, 2011).
In general, there are three possible explanations to this observed positive correlation between im-
porting and productivity. First, the productivity difference between importers and non-importers
may be due to self selection of firms to import intermediate inputs. That is, more productive
firms are more likely to import, as documented in Vogel and Wagner (2010). Second, importing
may increase firm revenue immediately through increased quality and variety of available inputs,
which improves firm performance, as documented in Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Goldberg
et al. (2009, 2010), and Halpern et al. (2011). This revenue effect can increase the measured
total factor productivity (TFP) of importing firms and it can happen even when the firm pro-
ductivity/technology is not changed. We refer to this static revenue effect of importing as static
effect throughout this paper. This static quality and variety effect is directly associated with the
usage of imported inputs. Once a firm stops importing, it cannot benefit from it anymore. Third,
importing experience may also have an impact on firms’ productivity, which in turn influences
firms’ future importing decisions and productivity. I will call the effect from this productivity-
importing interaction dynamic effect in this paper. This effect can arise from several different
channels. For example, importing firms have more exposure to foreign knowledge and technology,
which directly increase firms’ knowhow about production. This change of knowledge can directly
change firms’ productivity in the future (e.g. to reduce shutdown of production line). Importing
firms also usually receive some technical supports from their foreign suppliers, which directly
changes their knowledge about production and will have a long-term impact in the future. More-
over, importing can also incur firms to invest more in R&D possibly due to the newly available
1Earlier studies such as Ethier (1982), Romer (1990), and Grossman and Helpman (1991) also find such a
positive correlation.
1
inputs and newly available knowledge from abroad which help the firm to reduce the cost of in-
novation and/or increase its chances of a successful R&D. This increased R&D investment due to
importing can also increase firm productivity in the future. The term dynamic effect will contain
all these productivity-importing interaction results, including the direct effect of importing on
future productivity and the indirect effect of importing on future productivity through induced
R&D investment and other forms of investments.2 In either of the three cases, we would observe
a positive correlation between importing and productivity. A key implication is that we need to
estimate firms’ endogenous importing decisions and account for both static revenue effect and
dynamic productivity effect of importing simultaneously, in order to consistently evaluate the
long-term and short-term effects of a change of importing policy, such as a reduction of importing
barrier.
This paper estimates a dynamic structural model of firms’ endogenous decisions on whether to
import intermediate inputs or to rely exclusively on domestically-supplied inputs, and quantifies
its static effect and dynamic effect on firm value separately. In the model, firm productivity
evolves endogenously. The productivity, along with random fixed and sunk costs of importing
and other factors, determines firms’ importing decisions. The importing decisions, in turn, have a
dynamic effect on the future productivity of the importing firms. The model provides an approach
to estimating the short-term impact of importing on profit directly and simulating the long-term
impact of import expansion on firm performance. Based on this dynamic structural model, as one
contribution of this paper, we can use counterfactual analysis to separately quantify the static
effect and dynamic effect of importing in terms of increased firm value, which is defined as the
accumulated future profit. As specified in the model, the static effect, which results from improved
quality and variety of intermediate inputs due to importing, increases current profit immediately.
The dynamic effect, resulting from improved productivity due to importing, enhances future
profitability. As part of the model I also estimate the dynamic policy function of plants’ optimal
importing decisions, which depends on expected future profits and current fixed or sunk costs of
importing.
The import decisions, as mentioned above and also discussed in Andersson et al. (2008) and
Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), are usually associated with sunk and fixed costs, besides the usual
transaction price. First-time importers need to learn customs procedures, search for potential
foreign suppliers, testing whether the good matches current production line, negotiation, contract
formulation etc. These cost could be high, especially considering the long distance and potential
differences in language, business culture, legal system etc. Continuing importing is also associated
with fixed costs due to custom documents, administration fees for custom clearance, business
relationship maintenance, quality inspection etc. In the presence of import restriction such as
during the data period in Colombia, importers also need to pay additional costs to get the import
license and overcome the trade friction. All of these will be reflected as sunk and fixed costs of
2It will be great if we can evaluate the relative importance of these different channels of dynamic productivity
effect. Unfortunately, without detailed information on technical supports received by individual importing firms
and firm-level R&D in the Colombia data, which is used in the empirical study, we are unable to distinguish the
relative importance of these channels. This could be an interesting topic for future research. In this paper, the
dynamic productivity effect thus contains the total productivity effect of importing from all these channels.
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importing and they may have a substantial impact on individual firm’s import decisions. One
second purpose of this paper is to evaluate how trade policies influence the import participation,
productivity, and long-term payoff to individual firms by reducing/increasing the sunk and fixed
costs of importing.
I estimate the dynamic model structurally using a plant-level data set from Colombia. It is shown
that importing increases both the within-plant current period revenue and future productivity
substantially, lending evidence to the existence of both static and dynamic effects of importing.
Among all four industries investigated in this paper, being an importing firm increases its current-
year revenue positively by a lowest 22.47% in the other metal products industry and a highest
29.98% in the printing and publishing industry, indicating clear evidence of a static effect of
importing based on quality and variety effect. At the same time, being an importer increases
within-firm productivity in the next period positively from a lowest 0.54% in the printing and
publishing industry to a highest 5.80% in the structural metal products industry. This positive
productivity effect, on one hand, will be (partly) carried over to future periods through the Markov
productivity evolution process. On the other hand, the increased productivity will also affect the
firm’s importing decisions for the future, which further have an impact on future productivity.
Both of these two channels suggest a dynamic productivity effect of importing. The estimation
result also shows more productive firms tend to participate in importing of intermediate inputs.
In the first counterfactual exercise, I evaluate the total gains to firms from importing and the
relative contribution through the static revenue effect and dynamic productivity effect. I simulate
the within-firm total gains from importing, defined as the difference between the firm value in
the data and that in a conjectured autarky economy when firms are not allowed to import,
for each of the four industries. Results suggest the total gains from importing are substantial
and both static and dynamic effects are important sources of gains from importing intermediate
inputs. It is shown that importing access in the data increases firm value significantly, by 11.92-
23.79% in the four industries. It arises from immediately increased revenue and dynamically
increased productivity, though their relative contribution varies across industries. Among the
four industries, the dynamic effect alone increase firm value by 1.89-18.41%. This accounts for a
lowest share of the total gains from importing in the printing and publishing industry (15.86%),
and a highest share in the structural metal products industry (89.24%).
I also conduct two sets of policy counterfactual experiments to evaluate how trade liberalization
affects firm value. In the first set of policy counterfactual experiments, I evaluate the marginal
effects of sunk and fixed costs of importing on firm value. We find that high sunk and fixed
costs of importing act as a barrier for firms to import, which prevents them from enjoying the
gains from importing. Import liberalization by reducing sunk and fixed costs of importing can
increase firm value substantially. Taking pharmaceuticals industry as an example, counterfactual
analysis shows reducing the sunk and fixed costs of importing simultaneously by 10% increases
firm value by 0.67%. We also confirm that two trade policies—one changes sunk costs only and
the other changes fixed costs only—have very different quantitative impact on firm value. This
arises from the different implication of sunk and fixed costs on the persistence of firms’ importing
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decisions. In the second set of policy experiments, I evaluate the impact of another type of trade
reduction, which reduces import tariff, on firm value. I find that reducing tariff rate by 17%, as
happened in Colombia from 1990 to 1992, increases firm value substantially by 2.48%-12.04% in
the four industries we examined. The different impacts across industries are mainly driven by
these industries’ heterogeneity in productivity impact of importing and substitutability between
imported and domestic inputs.
The last, yet very important, question is: why should the effect of exposure to trade through im-
porting differ from that of exporting? The reason is that importing directly affects the production
process and potentially has a substantial impact on the productivity of importers. In contrast,
exporting only affects production indirectly through learning-by-exporting and changing demand.
Therefore, importing affects firm productivity through a more direct way which is different from
exporting.3 This implies that imports of intermediate inputs have to be accounted for when eval-
uating a trade policy. Since importing is usually positively correlated with exporting, to identify
the effect of importing, I also control for exporting in the empirical exercise. To make sure that
my estimate of the gains from importing is not due to exporting, I further conduct robustness
checks by performing the same estimation on a subsample of firms which do not export. The
subsample results are similar to what we find in the whole sample. This indicates that our results
on the gains from importing are robust.
Several recent papers are closely related to my work. Our theoretical model is structurally
based on Aw et al. (2011) which investigates the firms’ export behavior. Our work differs from
it in two ways. First, we consider firm/plant’s import decisions which potentially can affect
production, productivity, and profitability substantially. As discussed above, the import decisions
directly affect firms’ production process and potentially may have an even higher impact on
firm productivity. Second and more importantly, we explicitly disentangle the total gains from
importing into a static effect due to quality and variety effect, and a dynamic effect due to
productivity gains. This analytical framework can be applied to evaluate the short- and long-
term effects in other similar applications. Unlike the structural IO/trade approach of this paper,
a recently emerging literature in Macro-trade also tries to disentangle the static and dynamic
gains from trade based on different versions of Melitz (2003) model (Sampson, forthcoming; Perla
et al., 2015; Impullitti and Licandro, 2015, for example). Our paper differs from this line of
literature in that we focus on different channels of gains: while this literature investigates the
gains from trade through selection, technology spillover, and resource reallocation, we focus on
the gains from import through the static quality and variety effect and dynamic productivity
improvement to importers. In this sense, we see our paper complementary to this literature to
improve the understanding of gains from trade.
Kugler and Verhoogen (2009, 2012) emphasize the input quality effect of importing. They argue
that the output quality could be improved by using imported inputs with higher quality, under
3Using Indian data, Khandelwal and Topalova (2011) find lower tariffs on final goods and lower tariffs on
intermediate inputs both have positive effects on firm productivity, with input tariffs having a larger impact. This
result implicitly points to the possibility that international trade of intermediate inputs may have a larger impact
on firm productivity than international of final goods.
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the assumption that input quality and productivity are complementary to produce the output
quality. Goldberg et al. (2009, 2010) and Halpern et al. (2011), on the other hand, emphasize
the variety effect of importing. Goldberg et al. (2009, 2010) study how the increased availability
of new input categories as a result of importing enhances the development of new products and
thus increases the variety of final goods in India. Halpern et al. (2011) find that importing
more varieties of intermediate inputs increases firm productivity. Kasahara and Lapham (2013)
investigate the aggregate productivity gains of importing via resource reallocation in an extended
Melitz model (Melitz, 2003), while assuming that the productivity of each particular firm is fixed.
In contrast, my paper studies how importing improves the within-firm productivity and firm
value of the importing firms. Compared with the three lines of literature4, another new feature of
this paper is that I simultaneously estimate the gains from importing and endogenous importing
decisions in a structural model. This model allows me to further evaluate the relative importance
of the static effect and dynamic effect separately in terms of increased firm value.
The seminal work of Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) and Ge et al. (2011) also estimate the effect
of importing on firm productivity with the elements of static quality and variety effect and
productivity effect. My paper extends their work by explicitly modelling firms’ dynamic optimal
decisions of import in a full dynamic model. This additional work brings several advantages.
First, it allows us to evaluate the long-term gains from import in terms of discounted future profit
explicitly. Because productivity influences firms’ importing decisions and the importing decisions
in turn influence future firm productivity and profitability dynamically, taking into account the
endogenous importing decisions in a full dynamical model is a necessary step to fully capture the
total long-term gains from importing. Second, due to similar reasons, the full dynamic model also
provides a more accurate model-consistent prediction of firms’ dynamic import decisions. Third,
this paper quantitatively evaluates the relative importance of the static gains from importing
due to the “Quality and Variety Effects” from that of the dynamic productivity effect, both in
terms of contribution to long-term firm profit. Moreover, the structural model in my paper allows
me to use counterfactual analysis to evaluate the effects of different policy changes (e.g. change
of importing costs) on firms’ profitability and importing dynamics. My paper also relates to
Bøler et al. (2014), who also estimate a similar dynamic model of importing. While they focus
on the complementarity between imports of intermediate inputs and R&D in Norway, my paper
focuses on evaluating the relative importance of static and dynamic effects, and on the elasticity
of fixed/sunk importing costs on firm importing choice and firm value.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some basic facts in
the Colombian data, which forms the basis for the theoretical model. Section 3 introduces a
theoretical model to characterize firms’ dynamic importing decisions. Section 4 describes the
4Besides the three lines of literature, several other papers also investigate the effect of importing, but from
different angles. Bloom et al. (2012), for example, investigates how imports of Chinese final products affect the
productivity in OECD countries due to competition effect. Goel (2012) and Glass and Saggi (2001), in contrast,
focus on the effect of importing on employment and wage rate. Goel (2012) evaluates how imports of unskilled
intermediates (offshoring) increase employment and wage-bills of both skilled and unskilled workers by inducing
skill-biased technology. Glass and Saggi (2001) find increased outsourcing of production to a low wage country
leads to a lower relative wage and a faster rate of innovation.
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empirical model and estimation strategy and section 5 reports the estimation results. Section
6 discusses the self selection of firms in importing, and section 7 performs counterfactuals to
calculate the gains from importing and evaluate the gains from two types of import liberalization.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Data
The data set used in this paper is from the Colombian manufacturing census from 1977 to
1991, which was collected by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE).
The census covers all plants in the manufacturing sector for 1977-1982, and all plants with ten
or more employees after 1982.5 It contains detailed information about plants’ expenditure on
domestic intermediate input, imported intermediate input, output, investment, capital stock,
wage expenditure, number of workers, and many other plant characteristics (e.g. age, ownership).
For a detailed introduction to the data set, refer to Roberts and Tybout (1996) and Roberts and
Tybout (1997).
This paper focuses on four industries in the empirical exercises. They are pharmaceuticals,
printing and publishing, structural metal products, and other metal products. The choice of
industries reflects several considerations. First, since we are going to investigate the effect of
importing, we choose industries with relatively more importing firms. Second, all industries
are important industries for the Colombian economy, with the number of observations in each of
these industries large enough to do empirical investigation industry by industry. There are 12,164
observations in total for all four industries, with the number of observations varying from 1,793
to 5,355 for each industry.
We are particularly interested in the consumption of intermediate inputs and how much of them
is imported from foreign countries. In the data, intermediate input refers to the summation from
a list of inputs which the firm is allowed to write for “raw materials, materials, and packaging”.
This includes expenditure on raw materials such as cloth and gasoline, but does not include con-
sumption of electrical energy, “general expenses” such as professional services and advertising,
or “industrial expenses” such as spare or replacement parts, all of which are reported separately.
Materials sold without transformation are also excluded. These inputs are all short-term. Firms
are allowed to import some of their intermediate inputs from abroad and use both the domestic
and imported intermediate inputs in their production6. We observe the expenditure on imported
and domestic intermediate inputs separately in the data. Table 1 summarizes the mean and stan-
dard deviation for variables related to importing industry by industry. It is shown that importing
of material inputs plays an important role in these industries, with the share of importing ob-
servations ranging from 21.37-71.56% and expenditure share ranging from 27.95-62.82% in these
5These plants are “manufacturing plants” instead of “(all) plants of manufacturing firms”, according to page
229 in Roberts and Tybout (1996). As a result, it is very unlikely that they could be sales distribution hubs, which
are classified in retail and wholesale sector.
6In our dataset, almost all firms spend positive amount on domestic material inputs. We treat those firms with
zero or negative expenditure on domestic material input as misreporting and drop them. In all four industries in
total, there are only 25 such observations out of 12,164.
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four industries. Summary statistics of other variables used in this paper are also reported in
Table 1.
I start with a description of several stylized facts observed in the data, which motivate this
study and form the basis of the theoretical model in the following section. The first fact is that
although the importing status is subject to considerable turnover, it is still quite persistent over
time. Table 2 calculates the transition probability of importing status for the four industries. It
indicates that for all firms that were not importing, on average about 5% start importing the
next year and 95% stay not importing. Similarly, for all firms that were importing, on average
about 11% stop importing at the end of that year, while 89% of them continue importing. This
suggests while some shocks, such as shocks to productivity and importing costs in each period,
drives the turnover of importing status, some other firm characteristics such as productivity and
firm size ensure the persistence of importing status.
The second fact is that importers have higher labor productivity than non-importers, as shown
in Table 3. In all of the four industries, the industry mean of labor productivity for importers
is at least 67% higher than that for non-importers. As discussed above, this positive correlation
could be due to self selection, static revenue effect, or dynamic productivity effect of importing.
From the data pattern, however, we cannot tell which way the causality goes. That is, we don’t
know whether this productivity difference is because more productive plants tend to import
intermediate inputs, or because importing increases productivity.
Figure 1 further investigates the relationship between importing history and firm labor produc-
tivity. To construct this figure, the observations were classified into several groups according
to their importing history. For example, group 1 includes observations from firms that never
import in the data and group 2 includes all observations that are the last year before importing
7. A comparison of group 1 and group 2 indicates obvious selection of importing based on la-
bor productivity — firms that are about to starting importing are more productive than firms
that never import in the data. Group 3, which includes all observations importing for the first
time, contains the same set of firms as in group 2. Considering that it takes time for importing
experience to affect firm technology/productivity, the jump of labor productivity from group 2
to group 3 reflects mainly the static effect — the new importing firms benefit from the higher
quality and/or increased variety of imported intermediate inputs, which increases the current
period revenue immediately 8. In contrast, the increase of labor productivity from group 3 to
group 4 may contain both a static revenue effect if the firm increases their import in the second
year, and a lagged dynamic productivity effect from the importing experience in the first year.
We may additionally use the import volume data to help distinguish these two effects. More
interestingly, the average labor productivity of group 8 and 9, which represent observations after
7The full definition of the groups are as follows: group 1 includes observations from firms that never import in the
data and group 2 includes all observations that are the last year before importing; groups 3-6, respectively, collects
observations of the first, second, third, and fourth year of importing; group 7 includes observations corresponding
to N ≥ 5 years of importing; group 8 corresponds to observations of the first year after stop importing; group 9
collects observations of N ≥ 2 years after stopping importing. Note that all four industries are pooled together in
figure 1.
8Note that the labor productivity here is defined as revenue per worker.
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stopping importing, is still higher than that of group 2 before importing.9 This is consistent with
the existence of a dynamic effect of importing — firms still benefit from their past importing
experience even after stopping importing.
In the following sections, we are going to develop and estimate a dynamic structural model of
endogenous importing decisions at the firm/plant level, which are consistent with these stylized
facts.
3 The Model
In this section, I introduce a dynamic model to characterize plants’ decisions to import inter-
mediate inputs or rely solely on domestically-supplied inputs10, following the model developed
by Aw et al. (2011), which was initially used to analyze firms’ dynamic exporting decisions. An
important feature of this model is that it considers both the determinants and effects of import-
ing simultaneously. A new feature of the model in this paper is that it explicitly disentangles
the static effect and the dynamic productivity effect of importing within one unified framework.
These features allow us to investigate and quantify different sources of gains from importing.
3.1 Timing
Plants face monopolistic competition from other plants in the same industry, and the objective of
each plant is to maximize its discounted value of lifetime profits. The timing of the information
flow and decisions is as follows:
1. At the beginning of each date, each plant observes its own capital stock (Kjt), productivity
(ωjt), and its importing status for the current date (djt), as well as the aggregate demand
and production shifter, γt. These variables are summarized in sjt = {Kjt, ωjt, djt, γt} which
represents plant j′s state at date t.
2. Each plant chooses the amount of labor, domestic input, and imported input to maximize
its period profit. Then production and sales occur.
3. Each plant then observes the realization of its own sunk cost and fixed cost of importing.
I allow new importers to pay a potentially higher sunk cost of importing and continuing
importers to pay a potentially lower fixed cost of importing. These two costs are i.i.d drawn
from two different distributions.
4. Plants decide whether to import intermediate inputs next period based on their draw of
9Please be reminded that the firms in group 2 may be different from those from group 8 and 9. So the comparison
can only give a rough result. It will be much better if we look at the same class of firms if we have enough firms
which start importing and then stop importing in the data period. Unfortunately, the number of such firms is too
small so that no reliable inference can be based on that.
10The data do not link plants common to a firm, so we treat the plant as the decision-making unit. This is
potentially problematic because, among multi-plant firms, plant-level imports may partly respond to characteristics
of other plants. However, the vast majority of Colombian firms operate a single plant.
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sunk and fixed costs. If a plant decides to import next period, it pays the fixed cost if it is
importing this period, or the sunk cost if it is not importing this period.
5. Plants choose investment. All state variables are updated and the next period begins.
3.2 Technology and Demand
The production function is Cobb-Douglas, with a nested CES function to combine the domestic
and imported intermediate inputs. The nested CES function characterizes the static effect of
importing through quality effect and variety effect. A nice feature of this parametrization is
that the potential input quality effect and the input variety effect are explicitly represented by
parameters in the production function. This is in the spirit of the Halpern et al. (2011). The
production function is
Qjt = exp(ωjt + ξjt)
[
LαljtM
αm
jt K
αk
jt
]
with Mjt =
[
M
θ−1
θ
jdt + (AMjft)
θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
where ωjt is the productivity observed by plant j itself and ξjt represents the i.i.d measurement
error. Ljt and Kjt are labor and capital of plant j at date t. Mjdt and Mjft are domestic and
imported inputs used to produce the intermediate input Mjt. θ is the corresponding elasticity of
substitution of domestic and imported inputs. In some sense, θ represents the input variety effect
of imported products because it governs how easily the imported inputs can be substituted by
domestic ones in the production process. When θ is large, the two inputs are more substitutable,
meaning that the input variety effect of the imported inputs is small. A represents the input
quality effect of the imported inputs relative to domestic inputs, whose quality coefficient is
normalized to one. When A = 1, imported inputs have no quality advantage over domestic
inputs; when A > 1, imported inputs have relative quality advantage over domestic inputs; when
A < 1, imported inputs have relative quality disadvantage.11
If plant j is an importer of intermediate inputs, then the logarithm production function is
lnQjt = αl lnLjt + αm
θ
θ − 1 ln
[
M
θ−1
θ
jdt + (AMjft)
θ−1
θ
]
+ αk lnKjt + ωjt + ξjt (1)
If plant j is not an importer, then the logarithm production function takes the more familiar form
lnQjt = αl lnLjt + αm lnMjdt + αk lnKjt + ωjt + ξjt (2)
11To identify the quality parameter, A, ideally we need the physical quantity of domestic and imported inputs,
Mjdt and Mjft. However, in most cases researchers only have the value of inputs instead of physical quantity of
inputs, as in this paper. In this case, the quality parameter (A) we recover in the empirical exercise contains both
the real quality effect and the price difference between domestic and imported inputs, A = pd
pf
· (real quality effect
parameter).
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Demand is assumed to be the classic Dixit-Stiglitz type:
QDjt = ΦtP
η
jt,
where η is the demand elasticity, which is assumed to be common across products within one
industry. Pjt is plant j’s price. Φt is the time-specific demand shifter common for all plants.
3.3 Plants’ Static Decision
Plants produce differentiated products and face monopolistic competition in the output market.
Based on the timing described above, labor, domestic and imported inputs are static variables and
they depend on the beginning-of-date state sjt = {Kjt, ωjt, djt, γt}. A plant’s static optimization
problem is to choose these static inputs to maximize its own period profit.
When djt = 1, plant j has access to the import market in the current period. Observing the input
prices and the demand status, plant j’s static problem is to choose the static inputs (Ljt,Mjtd and
Mjtf ) and output price to maximize its period profit. Specifically, plant needs to choose static
inputs (Ljt,Mjtd and Mjtf ) to minimize the cost of producing any amount of output; then, facing
the plant level demand, the plant sets output price to maximize its period profit. Similarly, when
djt = 0, the plant has no access to the import market at date t; it chooses labor and domestic
inputs to minimize the cost of producing any amount of output, and then chooses output price
to maximize its period profit.
From plants’ period profit maximization, we can derive the revenue function as a function of
productivity, capital stock, current importing status, and a time-specific effect γt, which captures
the demand shifter and time-specific input prices. Put in logarithm form,
lnRjt = γt + rk lnKjt + rωωjt + rddjt (3)
with coefficients being rk =
αk
η
(1+η)
−(αl+αm) , rd =
[
αm/(θ−1)
η
(η+1)
−(αl+αm)
]
ln
[
1 +
(
APdtPft
)θ−1]
and rω =
(αl+αm)
η
(η+1)
−(αl+αm) . This equation shows that importing directly impacts current revenue through
quality and variety effect of importing, even when the technology/productivity is not changed.
The strength of the impact is rd, which is a function of A and θ. This implies that the effect of
importing on revenue depends on the strength of the input quality effect (A) and input variety
effect (θ) of imported inputs.
Under the demand and production assumptions above, total variable cost is a fixed share of
revenue
Cjt =
1 + η
η
(αl + αm)Rjt (4)
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The corresponding profit is a fixed share of the revenue
pijt =
[
1− 1 + η
η
(αl + αm)
]
Rjt (5)
Note that equations (4) and (5) are generalizations of equations (6) and (7) in Aw et al. (2011),
in which the marginal cost is assumed to be constant (αl + αm = 1). In their paper, the demand
elasticity can be directly estimated from data on total variable cost and revenue. In this paper,
if αl + αm is known, then the demand elasticity η can also be estimated similarly from data on
revenue and total variable cost.12
3.4 Dynamic Choice of Importing Status
Observing sunk and fixed costs, each plant’s dynamic optimization problem is to decide whether or
not to import materials in order to maximize its own continuation value. The main considerations
of importing participation are gains from importing, the fixed cost of continued importing, and
the sunk startup costs of importing. Previous importing status is relevant because first-time
importers need to pay the sunk cost (Csjt) and continuing importers instead pay the fixed cost
(Cfjt) to import. The sunk cost may be much higher than the fixed cost. Assume that the sunk
cost and fixed cost are i.i.d draws from two different distributions, Csjt ∼ F s and Cfjt ∼ F f . They
provide one source of exogenous shocks to the firm importing decisions.
The productivity (ωjt) follows a first order Markov process
Productivity : ωjt = E (ωjt | ωjt−1, djt−1) + εjt (6)
= g (ωjt−1, djt−1) + εjt,with iid εjt ∼ N(0, σ2ε)
where the innovation of the Markov process εjt is drawn from a normal distribution with mean
0 and variance σ2ε . The productivity shock provides another source of exogenous variation to
firm importing decisions. A new feature is that historical importing experience djt−1 affects
future productivity evolution process endogenously. If a firm was an importer at date t − 1,
its productivity will be enhanced due to the importing experience. This increased productivity
further affects future importing decisions, which in turn has an impact on future productivity.
This embodies the idea that importing intermediate inputs has a dynamic effect on productivity.
Since the importing decisions are endogenous, this setup implies that productivity is endogenous.
Next-period capital stock (Kjt+1) equals the current investment (ijt) plus current capital stock
after depreciation: Kjt+1 = (1 − ρk)Kjt + ijt, where ρk is the depreciation rate. Assume all
distributions and the evolution of the dynamic variables are common information. Plant j’s firm
12Refer to a separate online appendix for details about deriving equations (3), (4) and (5).
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value before it observes the current date fixed cost and sunk cost is
V (sjt) =
∫ ∫ [
pi(sjt) + max
djt+1
{
V 1(sjt)− djtCfjt − (1− djt)Csjt, V 0(sjt)
}]
dF s dF f (7)
where V 1(sjt) and V
0(sjt) are discounted choice specific continuation values of importing and not
importing, respectively, assuming that each plant always chooses optimal investment associated
with its importing status. djt is a discrete 0/1 variable identifying firm j’s importing status at date
t. Importing decision is dynamic through two channels: productivity channel and cost channel13.
On one hand, current importing decision affects future productivity. On the other hand, current
importing status determines what costs, sunk or fixed, the firm pay to import in the next period.
If the firm imported at date t, then it will pay a fixed cost Cfjt to continue importing at date
t + 1. If the firm did not import at date t, then it will pay a sunk cost Csjt (very likely higher
than fixed cost) to start importing.
Note that the value of investment is subsumed in the choice-specific value functions V 1(sjt) and
V 0(sjt). To be more precise the choice specific value functions could be written as
V 1(sjt) = δEtV (sjt+1 | sit, djt+1 = 1)
V 0(sjt) = δEtV (sjt+1 | sit, djt+1 = 0)
where δ is the discount factor. The expectation is taken over the stochastic evolution process of
productivity ωjτ for all τ ≥ t+ 1, and uncertainty about the demand shifter and input prices γτ
for all τ ≥ t+ 1. More specifically, by expressing expectation in integral form, the choice-specific
value functions are written as:
V 1(sjt) = δmax
Ijt
∫ ∫
V (sjt+1, djt+1 = 1)dF (ωjt+1 | ωjt, djt) dF (γt+1 | γt) (8)
V 0(sjt) = δmax
Ijt
∫ ∫
V (sjt+1, djt+1 = 0)dF (ωjt+1 | ωjt, djt) dF (γt+1 | γt) (9)
Equations (8) and (9) give the optimal investment decision rule, Ijt = It(ωjt, kjt, djt+1), which is a
function of productivity, capital, and future importing status. Equations (7), (8) and (9) together
fully characterize plants’ importing decisions under each state sjt and can be used to evaluate
the payoff to plants for each choice under each state. In the empirical exercise, for simplicity I
assume the time dummy γt to be a constant in the dynamic estimation.
4 Estimation Strategy
I observe in the data the value of domestic material, imported material, a 0/1 importing indica-
tor14, capital, investment, number of employees, wage expenditure, revenue and other plant char-
13Ramanarayanan (2011, 2013) also writes a model of firms’ importing decision which depends on productivity
and other factors and use the model to study the gains from import in the latter. In their model, firms’ choose
importing decision to maximize static profit.
14 The importing indicator equals 1 if the imported material is positive. It is zero otherwise.
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acteristics (e.g. age and ownership). The parameters to be estimated include: αl, αm, αk, η, A, θ,
g(·), σ2ε , F s, F f . The parameters of major interest in this paper are the input quality effect pa-
rameter A, the input variety effect parameter θ, the productivity evolution process g(·), and the
distributions of sunk cost and fixed cost (F s and F f ). A and θ represent the static productivity
effect of importing due to input quality effect and input variety effect. g(·) helps quantify the
dynamic productivity effect associated with importing.
Timing of events is important for identifying the model parameters, because the model setup
is based on it. Given the timing assumption, the source of identification is intuitive. Roughly
speaking, the static revenue effect intuitively is identified by comparing the revenue of firms
that import for the first year and that from the year before importing (group 2 and 3 in Figure
1), after controlling for productivity as shown in Eq. (3). The dynamic effect is identified by
comparing the productivity between the first and second year of importing (group 3 and 4 in
Figure 1). Specifically, the increase of revenue in group 4 contains both the lagged productivity
effect from their importing experience for the first year and the immediate static revenue effect
from importing in the second year. By controlling for the size of immediate revenue effect using the
import volume, we can separate the lagged productivity effect. The selection can be identified by
comparing the productivity of observations of last year before importing and that of firms which
never import (group 1 and 2 in Figure 1).
More specifically, the demand and production parameters, as well as the parameters governing
the productivity evolution process, can be identified from plants’ static decisions. Specifically,
information from plants exclusively using domestic inputs can help identify the share parameters
αl, αm, αk in the production function and the parameters associated with ωjt−1 in the productivity
evolution process g(·). On the other hand, usage of imported and domestic materials from
importing plants provides additional information to help identify the quality parameter A, the
elasticity of substitution θ, and the parameters associated with djt−1 in the productivity evolution
process g(·). Usage of imported and domestic materials from importing plants also provides
information about the share parameters αl, αm, αk and g(·), which can be used to improve the
estimation efficiency. Given the estimates for αl and αm, the demand elasticity can be identified
from the cost and revenue information.
Finally, the distributions of sunk cost and fixed cost can be identified from plants’ dynamic
decisions on whether or not to import intermediate inputs. Specifically, the average size of fixed
and sunk costs of importing are identified from the portion of firms which imports. If the sunk and
fixed costs is generally small, we should observe a large share of firms which import. Otherwise,
the share of importing firms should be small. In addition, the relative size of fixed and sunk costs
of importing are identified from the turnover rate of importing. If sunk cost is larger than fixed
cost, we should observe that once a firm starts importing, it is very likely that it will continue
importing in the next period. In other words, the persistence of importing status will be very
strong. In contrast, if the sunk cost is smaller than the fixed cost, we expect to observe that
many firms quit importing and then start importing in order to get the smaller sunk cost.
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The estimation algorithm combines the insights of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Das et al. (2007).
First, I estimate the production parameters αl, αm, αk, A, and θ, using data on labor, capital,
domestic and imported inputs and investment. Then given the estimates of αl and αm, the
demand elasticity is estimated from equation (4), using variable cost and revenue data. The
profit function can be derived from the estimate of the revenue function from equations (3) and
(5). Finally, the sunk and fixed costs parameters are estimated from plants’ decisions on whether
to import intermediate inputs. More precisely, the cost parameters can be identified from the
conditional choice probabilities (CCP) of that plants begin or stop importing intermediate inputs.
4.1 Production and Productivity Evolution Parameters
The parameters of production function and productivity evolution process include αl, αm, αk, A, θ, g(·),
and σ2ε . In order to increase estimator efficiency, I make use of the data on all plants (both im-
porters and non-importers) to estimate the production parameters, although the identification of
αl, αm, αk does not rely on information about importers. Denoting x = lnX and making use of
the importing status dummy djt for firm j at date t, equation (1) and (2) can be rewritten in one
equation as:
qjt = αlljt + αm
θ
θ − 1 ln
[
M
θ−1
θ
jdt + (AMjft)
θ−1
θ djt
]
+ αkkjt + ωjt + ξjt (10)
This equation allows us to use input and output data for all plants to estimate the produc-
tion parameters. ωjt constitutes the plant-level productivity observed by the plant (but not by
researchers), and ξjt is iid measurement error not observed by the plant and researchers. By
assumption, ξjt is independent with ljt, kjt,Mjdt,Mjft, and djt. However, it is a well known fact
that the direct OLS estimator from the above equation is subject to an endogeneity problem
because the labor and material inputs choices are dependent on ωjt. In addition, the importing
status djt is also correlated with ωjt because productivity is a Markov process. This correlation
further aggravates the endogeneity problem.
To ensure a consistent estimator, the above endogeneity problem must first be resolved. In
general, plants’ investment contains information about the unobserved productivity ωjt. Under
the timing assumption in this paper, investment is a function of current capital stock, productivity,
and the chosen importing status for the future, i.e. ijt = it(ωjt, kjt, djt+1). We can utilize the
insights of Olley and Pakes (1996) to recover the unobserved productivity ωjt from investment,
14
ωjt = ωt(ijt, kjt, djt+1), under the usual monotonicity assumption.
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qjt = αlljt +
αmθ
θ − 1 ln
[
M
θ−1
θ
jdt + (AMjft)
θ−1
θ djt
]
+ αkkjt + ωt(ijt, kjt, djt+1) + ξjt
= αlljt + αm
θ
θ − 1 ln
[
M
θ−1
θ
jdt + (AMjft)
θ−1
θ djt
]
+ φ(ijt, kjt, djt+1) + ξjt (11)
where φ(ijt, kjt, djt+1) captures the combined effect of capital and observed productivity on pro-
duction. The static input shares α̂l and α̂m, the quality parameter Â, the variety parame-
ter θ̂, and the φ(·) function can be estimated from equation (11) semiparametrically 16. This
estimation is consistent since ljt,Mjdt,Mjft, ijt, kjt and djt+1 are all uncorrelated with ξjt. In
this paper, φ(ijt, kjt, djt+1) is parameterized as a cubic function. Denote φ̂jt as the fitted val-
ue for φ(ijt, kjt, djt+1); then productivity can be expressed as ωjt = φ̂jt − αkkjt. Substitut-
ing ωjt in the production function with ωjt = g (ωjt−1, djt−1) + εjt and replacing ωjt−1 with
ωjt−1 = φ̂jt−1 − αkkjt−1 yield an estimation equation:
φ̂jt = αkkjt + g
(
φ̂jt−1 − αkkjt−1, djt−1
)
+ εjt + ξjt (12)
This equation can be estimated semi-parametrically. The parameter αk and the g(·, ·) function
can be retrieved from data on φ̂jt, φ̂jt−1, kjt−1, and djt−1. In this paper, the g(·, ·) function is
parameterized simply by g(ωjt−1, djt−1) = g0 + gωωjt−1 + gddjt−1. gω represents the marginal
effect of current productivity on future productivity, and gd represents the dynamic effect of
importing on productivity associated with importing. We are especially interested in gd and
we expect it to be positive based on our model. In the empirical exercise, I also estimated
an extend model in which I control for export decision in the productivity Markov process,
ωjt = g(ωjt−1, djt−1, ejt−1)+ ξjt = g0 +gωωjt−1 +gddjt−1 +geejt−1 + ξjt. Here ejt−1 is the discrete
0/1 exporting indicator with ejt−1 = 1 if the firm j is importing at t − 1. The parameter ge
is associated with ejt−1. I will estimate both the baseline model and extended model in the
empirical exercise.
Based on the estimate of αk, we can construct a pseudo sample of productivity for each plant
each year
ω̂jt = φ̂jt − α̂kkjt (13)
Note that if deflated revenue is used to proxy the output quantity in the estimation, as in the
empirical exercise in this paper, the recovered productivity is revenue-based (R-TFP in Foster
15To recover wjt by inverting investment function, a critical condition is that investment is strictly increasing
in productivity, which is a popular assumption in the literature. Intuitively, investment should (at least weakly)
increase in productivity. However, a sound econometric test of the validity of the assumption is still called for.
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) instead uses intermediate inputs to control for productivity. Ackerberg et al. (2006)
further develops a new approach based on timing assumption on the choice of inputs, in which all parameters are
estimated in one stage, to solve the potential collinearity problem in the first stage estimation in Olley and Pakes
(1996).
16Note that by assumption, the iid shocks of the sunk and fixed costs of importing provide independent variation
between the investment decision and the choices of labor, material, and djt. So this paper is not subject to the
collinearity problem in the first stage estimation of Olley and Pakes (1996), which was pointed by Ackerberg et al.
(2006). The author thanks Paul Schott for pointing this out.
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et al. (2008)).
4.2 Demand Elasticity and Profit Function
Plants’ static decisions lead to a simple relationship between the total variable cost and the
revenue, as shown in equation (4). The total variable cost is defined as the total expenditure on
domestic inputs, imported inputs and labor and is observed in the data. By introducing the usual
optimization error and measurement error, equation (4) can be written in the following estimable
form:
Cjt =
1 + η
η
(αl + αm)Rjt + ζjt (14)
The error term ζjt is assumed to be i.i.d across plants and over time. As in Das et al. (2007) and
Aw et al. (2011), we can estimate the demand elasticity η from equation (14), given that αl and
αm have been estimated above.
Construct the profit function. With all the estimates of production and demand parameters
in hand, we can compute the revenue function parameters rk, rw, and rd in equation (3). To
derive the full revenue function, we still need to estimate the coefficients of the time dummies.
Denote r˜jt = rjt − (rwω̂jt + rkkjt + rddjt) . The coefficients of time dummies can be estimated
from the following equation:
r˜jt = γt + ejt, (15)
where the error term ejt comes from an i.i.d measurement error or any form of optimization error
which affects plant revenue.
The revenue function is then Rjt = exp(γt + rkkjt + rwωjt + rddjt). The profit, as a fixed share of
the revenue function from equation (5), is a function of (γt, wjt, kjt, djt) ,
pijt =
[
1− 1 + η
η
(α1 + α2)
]
exp
(
γt + rkkjt + rwωjt + rddjt
)
(16)
where all unknown parameters are replaced with their estimates. This profit function is useful
when computing the value functions of plants in the next subsection.
4.3 Sunk/Fixed Cost Parameters
The distributions of sunk cost and fixed cost, in principle, can be identified from plants’ dynamic
discrete decisions of importing status. A maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is constructed
for estimating the distribution of both sunk and fixed costs in this section. As I am using a
short panel data, it is hard to estimate the evolution process of the macroeconomic environment
dummy, γt. In the dynamic estimation I treat the γt as a constant over time for simplicity.
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17In fact, the variation of γt over time is reasonably small for all four industries in question. For Parmaceutical
industry, γt ranges from 4.56 to 4.93, and the standard deviation of the estimates ranges from 0.21 to 0.22. For
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The conditional probability of observing a data point with djt+1 = 1, given state sjt = {ωjt, kjt, djt}
is
L1jt = Pr {djt+1 = 1 | sjt} (17)
= Pr
{
djtC
f
jt + (1− djt)Csjt ≤ V 1 (sjt)− V 0 (sjt) | sjt
}
The conditional probability of observing a data point with djt+1 = 0 is 1− L1jt. The probability
of observing importing status djt+1 is
Ljt = djt+1L
1
jt + (1− djt+1)(1− L1jt)
Under the i.i.d assumption on fixed and sunk costs of importing, the probability of observing a
specific importing history of plant j is
Lj =
∏
t=1:T
Ljt (18)
The probability of observing the importing status of all plants in the data set is
L =
∏
j=1:N
Lj =
∏
j=1:N
∏
t=1:T
Ljt (19)
Given the parametric assumption on the distributions of sunk and fixed costs, parameters in F s
and F f could be estimated using MLE. In this paper, I assume that sunk costs and fixed costs are
i.i.d drawn from two different exponential distributions, Csjt ∼ exp(cs) and Cfjt ∼ exp(cf). Then
the distribution parameters (λs = log(cs), λf = log(cf)) can be estimated by MLE. The major
problem associated with this estimation is that V 1 (sjt) and V
0 (sjt) need to be constructed for
each parameter iteration from the plants’ dynamic optimization problem, as specified in equations
(7), (8), and (9). The computational algorithm to solve for V 1(sjt) and V
0(sjt) is summarized in
the Appendix A.
5 Estimation Results
In this section, I will first report and briefly discuss the estimation results of the empirical model
from the plant-level Colombian data. I use the unbalanced panel data to structurally estimate
the dynamic model. I drop the first year for new firms and the last year for exiting firms to ensure
that for each observation the lagged and leading variables, in particular importing status djt−1
printing and publishing industry, γt ranges from 3.80 to 4.04, and the standard deviation of the estimates ranges
from 0.12 to 0.13. For structural metal industry, γt ranges from 2.56 to 3.01, and the standard deviation of the
estimates ranges from 0.19 to 0.21. For other metal industry, γt ranges from 2.53 to 2.88, and the standard deviation
of the estimates ranges from 0.12 to 0.13. In general the intra-industry variation of γt is small and they are not
statistically significantly different from each other. Moreover, although γt affects the level of revenue (and as a
result profit and long-term firm value), its effect on the ratio of the estimated gains from import relative to firm
value is small because γt emerges on both the numerator and denominator and the level effects can be canceled
out mostly. So we think this simplification does not cause a big problem.
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and djt+1, are fully observed.
18 I then use the unbalanced data to estimate the dynamic model
of importing decisions as well as the productivity evolution process.
5.1 Production and Productivity Evolution
Table 4 reports the estimates of production parameters derived from (11) and (12). I also add
plant age and ownership into the φ(·) to control for plant-specific characteristics in the regres-
sion.19 Age is the number of years in operation and ownership is a dummy variable which equals
1 if the plant is a public corporation and 0 otherwise 20. The magnitude of the estimated output
elasticities, αl, αm, and αk, are all in reasonable range. The estimated return to scale, defined as
the sum of the three output elasticities, is very close to one for all four industries. The ratio of
labor to capital output elasticities is larger in the labor-intensive printing and publishing industry,
and smaller in the capital-intensive pharmaceuticals industry.
We are particularly interested in the quality parameter (A) and elasticity of substitution (θ).
In all four industries, the input quality parameters A are all not statistically different from 1.
However, we must be cautious about how to interpret this result. As we estimate the model using
the value of imported and domestic inputs, the estimated quality parameter (A) contains both
the real input quality effect and the price difference between domestic and imported inputs. So
an estimate of A close to one means the imported intermediate inputs have no obvious quality
advantage in all these industries after adjusting for price difference. Or in other words, the
price difference of imported and domestic intermediate inputs reflects their quality difference,
corroborating earlier studies such as Kugler and Verhoogen (2012). To separate the real input
quality effect from the price difference, we need additional information on prices of both imported
and domestic inputs. Unfortunately, these data are not available in the Colombian data; therefore,
in the paper, the parameter A is interpreted as containing both the input quality effect and the
price difference between imported and domestic inputs. Another interesting finding is that the
elasticity of substitution θ−1θ is smaller than one. This implies that the variety effect of imported
inputs does exist, which is consistent with the argument in Markusen (1989) and Goldberg et al.
(2009, 2010) that domestic and imported intermediate inputs are complements to each other.
The estimates of productivity evolution process are recorded in Table 5. The estimation is based
on (12). The results from the baseline model are reported in panel A in Table 5. gω is the
effect of today’s productivity (ωjt) on tomorrow’s productivity (ωjt+1). gd measures the dynamic
effect of importing status on future productivity. In panel B of Table 5, I also control for the
18This paper shut down entry/exit in order to focus on the importing decisions, and this is a simple way to play
around the first-year/last-year problem. An alternative way of dealing with this problem is to explicitly consider
entry/exit in the model. Given that our focus is on the gains from importing to existing firms after controlling for
endogenous importing decisions, abstracting away from entry/exit does not seem to cause a big problem. However,
we do recognize that extensive margin due to entry/exit can contribute to the expansion of international trade as
in Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2013) for example.
19As a robustness check, we also estimate the model without controlling for age and ownership in the φ(·)
function. The results are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar and we report the results in Table A3.
20For clarity, the estimates of the non-parametric φ(·) function are not reported in the data. In practice, I used
a polynomial up to third order to approximate it in the estimation.
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export dummy in the productivity evolution process, as captured by ge. The parameter σω is
the standard deviation of the productivity shock, which is assumed to be normally distributed
N(0, σ2ω) in the estimation.
Both regressions yield consistent qualitative results. First, importing has a positive and statis-
tically significant effect on productivity evolution (gd > 0). If a plant imports today, its future
productivity will be improved significantly. Second, productivity evolution in all industries is
quite persistent over time (gω is above 0.8 in all industries). If a plant is productive today, it is
very likely that tomorrow it will continue to be productive.
If we compare the quantitative magnitude of the estimates in these two regressions, we find that
both regressions in general generate quantitatively similar estimates for all key parameters — in
the sense that the estimates of gd, gω and σω are all of similar magnitude in both regressions.
As the most important parameter of our interest, gd ranges from 0.0097 in the printing and
publishing industry to 0.0589 in the structural metal products industry in Panel A when we do
not control for exporting. After controlling for exporting in Panel B, it ranges from 0.0054 in
printing and publishing industry to 0.0580 in the structural metal products industry. We can see
that they are of similar magnitude. However, in general the effect is relatively smaller, though
very slightly, after controlling for exporting. This might be due to a potential positive correlation
between importing and exporting. The estimated effect of importing would have picked up the
effect of exporting if exporting is not controlled for in the baseline model. I will rely on the results
from panel B to compute the dynamic effect of importing. After controlling for exporting, being
an importer this year can improve the next period productivity by 1.09% in the pharmaceuticals
industry for example. This productivity effect could be as large as 5.80% in the structural metal
products industry.
Figure 2 simulates how importing dynamically affects the expected within-firm productivity in
30 years for each of these industries. I compute the expected productivity based on the estimated
productivity evolution process for firms which do not import and for those which always import.
In the first column of Figure 2, the starting productivity was chosen at the 10% quintile of each
industry, lower than the steady state productivity implied by the Markov productivity process.
Compared with firms that do not import, firms that always import–as characterized by the
solid curve–not only have a higher growth rate of productivity during the transition period, but
also have a higher level of productivity at steady state. Being always importing increases the
within-firm productivity in the steady state significantly, by 3.53%, 3.25%, 13.84%, and 4.78%
in these four industries, respectively. Similarly, in the second column, the starting productivity
was chosen at the 90% quintile of each industry, higher than the steady state productivity. We
find the productivity of firms that always import goes down more slowly in the transition process
with a higher level at steady state, compared with firms that do not import.
I also ran two regressions to check the robustness of dynamic productivity effect of importing
to different measures of import. In both regressions, I use import expenditure share, instead of
importing dummy, to measure the effect of importing on productivity. The first regression is
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the baseline model without controlling for export, while in the second export is controlled for
using an export dummy. In both regressions, I found a positive and significant effect of importing
on productivity. These results are summarized in Table A1. These observations confirm the
conjecture in the model section that importing has a positive dynamic effect on productivity. We
will compute the gains of firm value from this dynamic effect in section 8.
5.2 Demand Elasticity and Revenue Function
The demand elasticity can be estimated from equation (14) given output elasticity of labor and
material. The results are reported in Panel C of table 5. The estimated demand elasticity
is significantly less than -1. This is reasonable because the market power in the monopolistic
competition market allows plants to charge a markup price. Under the structural assumptions of
production and demand, plants’ revenue and profit functions can be constructed using (3) and
(5). This is useful for estimating dynamic parameters and constructing firm value in the next
subsection.
I report the revenue function parameters, rω, rk and rd, for each of the four industries in Table 6.
The standard errors are computed from 200 draws from the parameter estimates of production
function and demand elasticity. It is shown that importing on average can increase the current-
period revenue by about 22.47%-29.98% in these four industries, suggesting that importing firms
can benefit from a combination of the improved quality and/or increased variety of imported
inputs immediately. The positive effect of importing on current revenue corroborates the result
in Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008). This is the source of static effect of importing. I will quantify
by how much it increases firm value in Section 7. Meanwhile, rω is the revenue elasticity of
productivity. For example, rω = 1.6948 in pharmaceuticals industry implies that a 1% increase in
productivity increases current period revenue by 1.6948%. Similarly, rk = 0.1556, as the revenue
elasticity of capital, implies a 1% increase in capital stock increases revenue by 0.1556%. Because
profit is a fixed share of revenue given the Dixit-Stiglitz demand function, this table shows that
a firm can increase its profit by increasing its productivity, capital size, and by using imported
intermediate inputs of higher quality or more variety.
5.3 Distribution of Sunk and Fixed Costs
As noted above, the distribution parameters of the fixed and sunk costs can be estimated with
Maximum Likelihood, using plants’ dynamic decisions on whether or not to import intermediate
inputs. To limit the range of the parameters in the estimation, I redefine λs = log(cs), λf =
log(cf) and estimate the parameters λs and λs in the Matlab program.
The estimates of λs and λf are reported in Table 7. It is shown that, first, the draw of sunk
costs of importing could be quite large, which serves as a big barrier for plants to start importing.
Conditional on importing, those firms actually import in the data bear a sunk costs of importing
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ranges from 176 thousand in printing and painting industry (8.17% of yearly profit) to as high as
940 thousand for Parmaceutical industry (34.17% of yearly profit) in 1986 US dollars if they are
first-time importers. In the other two industries, the sunk costs are 898 thousand for structural
metal industry and 696 thousand for other metal industry also in 1986 US dollars. These estimates
are of similar order of magnitude as that reported in Kasahara and Lapham (2013), which reports
a sunk cost of importing ranging from 459 thousand 1990 US dollars for Plastic Products to 874
thousand 1990 US dollars for food products using Chilean plant-level data. Compared with the
export sunk costs estimated in Das et al. (2007) using the same Colombia plant-level dataset,
the sunk costs of import is also comparable and even larger, presumably reflecting the fact that
Colombian firms faced very strict import friction but much smaller export friction during the data
period. Secondly, the estimate of the fixed cost parameter λf is significantly smaller than that of
sunk cost parameter λs in all four industries. This implies sunk cost appears to be always larger
than fixed cost in all of these industries, which is consistent with the idea that new importers
need to invest additionally to start importing. In order to maintain the same import probability
as above, the firms actually import in the data pay a fixed costs of importing ranging from 3.58
thousand (about 0.17% of yearly profit) for printing and publishing industry to as high as 36.73
thousand (about 1.34% of yearly profit) for pharmaceutical industry in 1986 US dollars, which
are much smaller compared with sunk costs.
The large sunk and fixed costs of importing reflect both the explicit and hidden costs of importing
to firms. As Andersson et al. (2008) point out, importing is associated with fixed costs that are
sunk, because import agreement is preceded by a search process for potential foreign suppliers,
inspection of goods, testing whether the good matches current production streamline, negotiation,
contract formulation etc. These costs may be very high. Also, first time importers need to spend
both human and monetary resources to learn customs procedures. This again increases the sunk
cost. As for the fixed cost, continuing importers do not need to pay costs to master the customs
procedures, and they have more experience in importing. So we expect that fixed cost will be
much lower than sunk cost, as shown in the estimation results. However, fixed costs could still
be high due to different reasons. First, continuing importers still need to maintain the business
relationship with their trade partners via different forms, which may be costly. Second, although
first-time importers have inspected the goods, they still need to inspect goods each time they
continue importing in order to make sure that the international exporters deliver the appropriate
materials. Moreover, the estimated sunk and fixed costs parameters also pick up the import
frictions due to trade policy. For example, in Colombia there were quota and license restrictions
on some products for importing, as documented in Roberts and Tybout (1996). As a result, plants
planning to import need to spend extra time and resources (both monetary and non-monetary) to
lobby importing licenses, legally or illegally. All of the quota-induced costs related to importing
are picked up by the fixed/sunk costs estimated in the model and can contribute to the large
estimated sunk/fixed costs.
The fact that the sunk cost is much larger than the fixed cost is consistent with our model
conjecture that sunk cost is a critical factor that generates the observed persistence of plants’
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importing status. A new importing firm need to pay the sunk cost to start importing. In contrast,
a continuing importing firm pays the fixed cost, which is on average much smaller than the sunk
cost. This explains why compared to non-importers, importers today are more likely to import
tomorrow. Also, the large sunk costs prevent non-importers from starting to import. Only those
non-importers who have a very small draw of the sunk cost start importing. This explains that
why only a few non-importers start importing at each period.
5.4 Robustness Check
Our goal is to accurately measure the effects of importing intermediate materials on productivity
and firm value. As such, it is important to have confidence that the estimation results from
the model are robust and not sensitive to particular underlying assumptions in the model. In
particular, we need to make sure that the estimated effect of importing is not actually the effect of
exporting, considering the possible correlation between the two activities. To remove the impact
of exporting on the estimation results, I estimate the model for non-exporters only and its results
then are compared with those estimated by using the whole sample.21
Tables A2 reports the estimates of the model parameters using the subsample with only non-
exporters. The estimation results are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to that esti-
mated using the whole sample. First of all, the production parameters are of similar magnitude.
Second, importing as expected has a positive impact on productivity in the non-exporter sub-
sample. In the Markov productivity evolution process, the coefficient of the importing dummy
ranges from 0.0086 to 0.0458, which is again of similar magnitude to that estimated using the
full sample. Importing also has a positive impact on revenue, with the coefficient ranging from
0.1444 to 0.3550. This is again close to that found in the full sample. Finally, the estimates of
the distribution parameters of sunk and fixed costs are similar to that derived in the full sample
— in the sense that their magnitude is similar and that sunk cost parameters are significantly
larger than fixed cost parameters. These results show that the estimated effect of importing on
revenue and productivity is robust and that the estimated effect of importing is actually not the
effect of exporting.
21For this robustness check to be valid, we need to rule out the possibility that the plants in the remaining
non-exporter subsample may be sales distribution hubs. Thank the referee for pointing this out. We can rule out
this possibility from the following evidence. First, These plants are “manufacturing plants” instead of “(all) plants
belonging to manufacturing firms”, according to page 229 in Roberts and Tybout (1996). Second, the import
probability in the non-exporter subsample is substantially lower than that in the full sample. In the subsample it is
62.1%, 19.0%, 17.6%, and 27.7% for the four industries, which are substantially lower than that in the full sample
as reported in Column 2 in Table 1. Third, the import-revenue ratio conditional on importing in the non-exporter
subsample is very close to that in the full sample. For the four industries, this ratio is 20.3%, 15.0%, 16.8%, and
21.8% in the subsample, contrast to 16.9%, 16.2%, 16.1%, and 22.6% in the full subsample. This suggests that
the non-exporter plants are unlikely to be sales distribution hubs, because otherwise they should have much higher
import probability and import-revenue ratio conditional on importing.
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6 Self Selection
As part of the model, the dynamic policy function of plants’ optimal importing decisions is
also estimated within the structural model. The importing status choice is determined by the
comparison between the involved fixed or sunk costs of importing and the net benefit of importing
in terms of expected firm value. From the dynamic model developed above, a non-importing plant
in state sjt = (ωjt, kjt, djt = 0) chooses to start importing if and only if its draw of sunk cost is
smaller than the expected gain associated with importing,
Csjt ≤ V 1(sjt,djt = 0)− V 0(sjt,djt = 0), (20)
where V 1(sjt,djt = 0) and V
0(sjt,djt = 0), as functions of sjt given djt = 0, are choice-specific
value functions corresponding to choosing djt+1 = 1 and djt+1 = 0, respectively. This condition
determines the threshold sunk cost for current non-importers to start importing. Similarly, a
current importer with state sjt = (ωjt, kjt, djt = 1) chooses to continue importing if and only if
its draw of fixed cost is smaller than the expected gains from continuing to import,
Cfjt ≤ V 1(sjt,djt = 1)− V 0(sjt,djt = 1), (21)
where V 1(sjt, djt = 1) and V
0(sjt, djt = 1) are the choice-specific firm value when the current
importer continues import and when it does not, respectively. This condition determines the
threshold cost involved in current importers’ decision of whether or not to continue importing.
The choice-specific firm values on the right hand side of (20) and (21) are functions of the state
variables sjt = (ωjt, kjt, djt). They are defined in (8) and (9) and are all estimated within the
dynamic model along with the dynamic estimation of parameters. So the importing decisions
depend on firm’s state sjt = (ωjt, kjt, djt) and its draw of i.i.d sunk or fixed costs of importing.
In particular, the i.i.d draw of sunk and fixed costs of importing and transitory productivity
shock together provides exogenous variations of the turnover of importing status. Meanwhile, the
persistence of productivity and capital stock, and the fact that sunk cost is larger than fixed cost
of importing together ensure the persistence feature of importing status over time. Empirical
results show that productivity and sunk/fixed costs of importing are the major determinants of
firm-level importing status. Firms with high productivity and low importing costs will import.
Meanwhile, although in general larger firms are more likely to import, we find that capital stock
does not affect the importing decision much after conditioning on productivity.
Figure 3 plots the importing decisions for each of the four industries. The left column is the
importing decision of firms that are currently not importing and the right column is for firms
that are importing. The horizontal and vertical axis represent productivity and sunk/fixed costs
of importing, respectively. The curves are the break-even points in (20) and (21). Firms that are
below these curves will import, because their gains from importing is larger than the sunk/fixed
costs of importing. This result suggests obvious selection based on productivity and sunk/fixed
costs of importing—more productive firms with low importing costs tend to import.
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7 Gains from Importing Intermediate Inputs
This section performs three counterfactual experiments based on the structural model. These
three experiments serve three purposes: to quantify the within-plant gains from importing in-
termediate inputs, to evaluate the relative contribution of importing through the static revenue
effect and a dynamic productivity effect, and to quantify the marginal effect of import costs on
firm value.
7.1 Total Gains from Importing
The within-plant total gains from importing intermediate inputs is defined as a firm’s value in the
data when it has access to the foreign import market minus the firm value of the same plant in
a counterfactual autarky economy. An autarky refers to an economy in which none of the plants
have access to a foreign market. The autarky plant value can be easily derived by solving the
following standard investment model
V (ωjt,Kjt) = pi(ωjt,Kjt) + δmax
ijt
Eωjt+1V (ωjt+1,Kjt+1) (22)
s.t. Kjt+1 = ijt + (1− ρk)Kjt
ωjt+1 = E (ωjt+1 | ωjt) + εjt+1
It is straightforward that the solution to the autarky model is equivalent to our full model with
infinite fixed and sunk costs for importing. Using this idea, we can easily calculate the autarky
plant value from our full model by letting the sunk and fixed costs be infinite. The total gains
from importing intermediate inputs can be calculated as
Total gain = V (sjt)− V (ωjt,Kjt). (23)
Note that allowing firms to import inputs globally, as a option, increases firms’ value even when
they are not importing currently. The possibility to use this option to import in the future —
in the case of having a good productivity shock or a good draw of sunk cost of importing —
increases a firm’s expected future profit, even when it is not importing currently.
One limitation of this exercise is that we implicitly assume that the intermediate input prices will
not change when computing firm value in the autarky economy, which is not ideal in practice. In
fact, the intermediate input price would very likely be higher in the autarky economy, because
firms cannot import from abroad. As a result, firm value in the autarky economy would be even
lower and the true total gains from importing should be even larger. So we should treat the total
gains calculated in (23) as the lower bound of gains from importing.
In order to evaluate the average within-firm gains from importing for each industry, I compute
the gains for each observation in the data given its state variable (ωjt, kjt, djt), using the formula
in (23) based on counterfactual analysis. Table 8 reports the industry mean of total gains from
24
importing intermediate inputs for each industry, in terms of increased firm value. The first
two columns report the industry mean of firm value in the data and in the autarky economy,
respectively. The last two columns calculate the increased firm value or its percentage change
as a result of importing. It is shown that, compared with autarky, importing access in the data
increases firm value substantially from 11.92% in printing and publishing industry to as high as
23.79% in pharmaceuticals industry.
I also plot the kernel density distribution of the firm value in the data and in the autarky economy
separately, for each of the four industries in Figure 4. In the figure, the solid curve is the kernel
density estimation of firm value in the observed data, and the dot-dashed curve is that for the
autarky. It is shown that the firm value in the data stochastically dominates that in the autarky,
further supporting the idea that importing access in the data increases firm value comparing with
the autarky economy.
It is worth noting that in the policy experiment, in order to simply the structural estimation we
follow Aw et al. (2011) to abstract away from the general equilibrium effect on material input
prices, other input prices, and output prices. This may bias the quantitative results. However,
compare with the first order effect calculated in this paper, the general equilibrium is of second
order and its effect should be smaller. In Section 7.5 we discuss this question in more detail and
perform two sets of tests to show that our results are robust enough to the time dummy in the
revenue function, which captures the general equilibrium effect.
7.2 Static and Dynamic Gains from Importing
In this subsection, I decompose the importing gains into the static effect and the dynamic effect,
by simulating several modified versions of the full model.
When there is no dynamic effect of importing, gd = 0. We can solve the full dynamic model under
the restriction gd = 0 to derive a new plant value, V (sjt | gd = 0), which does not contain the
dynamic effect. I define the gains from dynamic effect as the difference between the firm value in
the full model and V (sjt | gd = 0),
Dynamic Effect = V (sjt)− V (sjt | gd = 0). (24)
Then the static effect can be computed as the difference between the value of a firm when it has
access to importing but has no dynamic effect, V (sjt | gd = 0), and the firm value in the autarky
economy, V (ωjt,Kjt),
Static Effect = V (sjt | gd = 0)− V (ωjt,Kjt). (25)
By definition, the sum of dynamic effect and static effect equals the total gains from importing.
I compute the counterfactual firm value, V (sjt | gd = 0), for each observation in the data first.
Then I can derive the dynamic effect and static effect using (24) and (25), for each data point.
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The industry means of static and dynamic gains from importing, in terms of firm value, are
reported in Table 9. It is shown that both dynamic and static effects are important in these
industries, although their relative importance varies among industries. For example, in phar-
maceuticals industry the dynamic productivity effect alone increases firm value by 5.93%, while
the static effect derived from improved quality and variety of intermediate inputs increases firm
value by 17.86%, suggesting that both of them are important sources of gains from importing.
In contrast, the static effect is relatively more important in printing and publishing industry, in
which the static effect increases firm value by 10.03% compared with 1.89% for dynamic effect. As
a comparison, dynamic effect is relatively more important in structural metal products industry.
It increases firm value by 18.41% while static effect contributes a increase of firm value by 2.22%
only. The cross-industry variation of the relative importance of the static and dynamic effect
reflects the different magnitude of productivity effect and quality and variety effect reported in
Table 4 and 5. In printing and publishing industry when price-adjusted quality parameter A is
the smallest (close to 1), the static effect is small. In contrast, in structural metal industry the
productivity effect of importing is the highest, it is dynamic effect is large.
I also plot the kernel density estimation of the counterfactual firm value without dynamic effect,
V (sjt | gd = 0), in Figure 4 industry by industry. It stochastically dominates the density of the
autarky firm value, but it is stochastically dominated by that in the data with both static and
dynamic effects. In general, both Table 9 and Figure 4 suggest that both static effect and dynamic
effect are important sources of gains from importing — although their relative importance may
depend on the characteristics of the industry. One key implication is that we have to consider
firms’ gains from importing both in the short term and in the long term when evaluating the
effect of an importing policy, because firms can benefit from importing both statically when they
are importing and dynamically even after they stop importing. If we only include the static effect,
we will inadvertently underestimate the gains from importing.
7.3 Policy Counterfactual I: Sunk/Fixed Costs of Import and Firm Value
The fight between trade protection and trade liberalization has been pervasive in the history of
international trade, and it is still popular even nowadays for both economic and political reasons.
In this subsection, I examine the effect of a specific type of import liberalization/protection, by
quantifying the marginal effect of sunk and fixed costs of importing on firm value in the presence
of both static and dynamic effects of importing. The sunk/fixed-costs-associated import liberal-
ization/protection has an impact on expected firm value by changing firms’ current and future
importing decisions, as indicated by the model. This work is done by performing counterfactual
analysis based on the dynamic structural model.
In Panel A of Table 10, I examine the effect of import liberalization on firm value. I reduce the
mean of both costs in Panel B of Table 10 by 5%, 10%, 25%, and 50% separately, while keeping
other primitive parameters unchanged, and compute their effect on firm value in each of the four
industries. When there is a 5% reduction of both costs, the firm values in these four industries
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are reduced by 0.33%, 0.35%, 0.73%, and 0.51%, respectively. The effect on firm value increases
nonlinearly when we reduce these costs further. When reducing both costs by 50%, the firm value
increases more significantly by 3.53%, 4.56%, 9.91%, and 5.83%. Again, I plot the kernel density
estimation of firm value after reducing both the sunk and fixed costs by 25% and 50% separately
in Figure 6 industry by industry. We find that reducing costs of importing shifts the distribution
of firm value to the right. This suggests a negative effect of importing costs on firm value, again
consistent with the findings in Table 10.
Similarly, Panel B quantifies the effect of a increased import protection on firm value, as embodied
by the increased sunk and fixed costs of importing. Based on the data, I increase the mean of
both sunk and fixed costs by 5%, 10%, 25%, and 50% and solve the model again to compute the
firm value in each of these cases, while keeping other primitive parameters unchanged. It is shown
that a 5% increase of both sunk and fixed costs decreases firm value by 0.33% in pharmaceuticals,
0.34% in printing and publishing, 0.69% in structural metal products, and 0.49% in other metal
products. As the costs of importing becomes larger, this effect becomes larger. When both
costs are increased by 50%, the firm values in these four industries are reduced by 3.14%, 2.84%,
5.67%, and 4.42% in the above four industries, respectively. As a example, I plot the kernel density
estimation of firm value when increasing both the sunk and fixed costs by 25% and 50% in Figure
5 industry by industry. It is shown that increasing costs of importing shifts the distribution of
firm value to the left, suggesting a negative effect of importing costs on firm value.
As implied by our model, the relative magnitude of sunk and fixed costs of importing predicts
different persistence of importing behavior. In particular, high sunk cost implies high persistence
of importing status; in contrast, high fixed cost implies low persistence of importing status.
As a result, trade policies that reduce sunk and fixed costs separately may have very different
implication on plants’ importing decisions and as a result gains from importing.22 We perform
two sets of counterfactual experiments, by changing sunk costs and fixed costs of importing
separately, to evaluate the different effects on firm value of government policies that changing
sunk and fixed costs separately. The results are reported in Table 11. The results first confirm
that sunk costs and fixed costs have different impact on gains from importing, although their
relative importance varies across industry and also depends on the size of costs change. For
example in pharmaceuticals industry a 5% reduction of fixed costs alone increases firm value by
0.26% while the same percentage reduction of sunk cost only increases firm value by 0.07%. A
similar pattern is observed in the other metal products industry. In the other two industries,
the relative impact of sunk and fixed costs varies depending on the strength of policy change.
A second interesting result is that the policy impact is nonlinear to policy strength. When the
fixed costs of importing is reduced by from 5% to 50%, the firm value increases slightly more
than proportionally in all four industries. This nonlinear change, however, is much stronger for
sunk costs-related policies. When the sunk costs of importing is reduced by from 5% to 50%,
22Impullitti et al. (2013) show a similar mechanism at play for export decisions in a version of the Melitz model
with post entry productivity uncertainty. They find that while a reduction in the fixed export costs makes the
export decision more persistent, lowering sunk export costs reduces export persistence. Although their model differs
from ours, a similar mechanism is at play in both models. We thank a anonymous referee for bringing out this
interesting discussion to us.
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for example in Parmaceuticals, the increase of firm value changes from 0.07% to 0.86%, which
is much more than proportional change. This pattern holds in all four industries. The third
interesting finding is that the relative impact of a reduction of fixed costs, compared with sunk
costs, rises in the magnitude of sunk and fixed costs. If we rank the size of costs from lowest
(-50%) to high (+50%) in Table 11, the relative impact on gains due to a change of fixed costs
rises, as reported in Part III of Table 11. These differences arise from the fact that sunk costs
and fixed costs plays different roles in determining firms importing decisions.
Our estimation results have important implications for trade policy, especially for developing
countries. As we know, developing countries on average set more barriers in international trade.
The large gains from importing access and the significant effect of importing costs on firm value
suggest that developing countries can benefit from opening their markets to more actively import
intermediate inputs. Moreover, as the cost/risk of a policy change is usually short-term, the
government faces an intertemporal tradeoff between the long-term gain and short-term cost of a
trade policy change. The finding that dynamic effect is significant suggests even when the static
gains from importing (through input quality effect and input variety effect) is smaller than the
cost of trade, the government may still find it beneficial to encourage importing if the dynamic
gain is large enough. Moreover, the relative effectiveness of fixed cost-reduction policy and sunk
cost-reduction policy suggests that government need to carefully choose from these two policy
tools if they have a choice.
7.4 Policy Counterfactual II: Import Tariff Reduction and Firm Value
A tariff reduction reduces the relative prices of imported inputs compared with domestic alter-
natives, and as a result, increases the price-adjusted import quality (parameter A in the model).
This results in higher benefit of importing, leading to more firms participating in importing and
higher volume of import conditional on importing. In the second counterfactual, I evaluate the
effect of an import tariff reduction on firm value in the long run.
To simplify the analysis, we assume complete tariff pass through and that a 1% import tariff cut
reduces the import-domestic price ratio by the same percentage. Then the new price-adjusted
import quality is
Anew =
1 + τ
1 + τnew
A,
where A and Anew are, respectively, the price-adjusted import quality estimated in the data and
that implied by the new tariff rate in the counterfactual. τ and τnew are the tariff rate in the
data period and that in the counterfactual, respectively.
In Colombia there is a radical change of import tariff at the very end of our data period. The
average import tariff rate drops from about τ = 27% in the data period to about τnew = 10%
after the data period in 1992 and thereafter. Given this tariff change, we calculate the new
price-adjusted import quality Anew, re-solve firms’ static and dynamic decisions, and calculate
the resulting change of firm value. The results are reported in Table 12. As shown in the
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fourth row, a 17% drop of tariff increases the average firm value substantially by 2.48% in the
pharmaceuticals industry to as high as 12.04% in the structural metal products industry. We also
find that the impact of the tariff reduction on firm value varies substantially across industries.
In the structural metal and other metal products industries, the impacts are much larger. This
is reasonable because on one hand the domestic and imported inputs are more substitutable in
these two industries (higher elasticity of substitution θ reported in Table 4). Firms in these
two industries can benefit more because they can easily substitute their domestic inputs by
the imported inputs after tariff reduction. On the other hand, the higher effect of import on
productivity in these two industries, as reported in Table 5, also contributes to the higher gains
from tariff reduction. I report the effects on firm value of more moderate and more radical changes
of tariff rate in the other rows of Table 12. They are calculated in the same way as above. The
cross-industry pattern of gains from tariff reduction is similar to above, and higher tariff reduction
leads to substantially higher gains of firm value.
7.5 Discussion of the Results
We made several assumptions in order to make the model tractable and focus on our main
question. Here we discuss the costs and benefits of making these assumptions and their potential
impact on our main results.
Dynamic Export Decisions. It is worthy of noticing that in order to simplify the model and
focus on firms’ importing decisions, we abstract away from firms’ dynamic export decisions. While
this simplification saves us from modeling export demand23 and reduces the computation burden
substantially, it may bias the estimates of gains from import downwards. In principle, export may
amplify the gains from import because it gives the firm another opportunity to further explore
the benefits from importing. So abstracting away firms’ export decisions may underestimate the
gains from import.
Importer-Exporter Linkage. Another potential limitation of this setup is that while importing
decisions may also be affected by its trading partners who are exporters in foreign countries,
especially if the Colombian importers are sales distribution hubs of their foreign parent firms, we
abstract away from it due to lack of linked importer-exporter information.24 We think this is
reasonable because evidence shows that it is very unlikely that these plants are sales distribution
hubs of their foreign headquarters as will be discussed in detail in Section 5.4. So we treat
Colombian importers as independent decision-making units in this paper. We think it is still very
informative to understand firm importing and production decisions given that these plants are
not sales distribution hubs and that the majority of Colombian firms are single-plant firms (Das
et al., 2007).
General Equilibrium Effect. The model presented in this paper is a standard single-agent
23Due to lack of export price data, unfortunately we are unable to estimate the export demand separately from
domestic demand without adding more assumptions.
24We thank one anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
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dynamic model and as a result the general equilibrium effect is abstracted away. For example,
in a standard CES preference case the demand shifter Φt, which determines the intercept of
the revenue function γt, is a function of the industry aggregate price and output in general
equilibrium. We abstract away this general equilibrium effect in the model and treat γt as a
(exogenous) time dummy. Because in the empirical analysis the estimates of γt over time are
statistically not different from each other, we used their mean as the intercept of the revenue
function following Aw et al. (2011). One big advantage of doing so is that we do not have to solve
the dynamic general equilibrium model with many heterogeneous agents facing both idiosyncratic
and aggregate uncertainties. Another advantage is that we do not have to track the evolution of
these general equilibrium-related time dummies, so it reduces the state space by one dimension.
These two advantages together, as a result, help to reduce the computation burden substantially
in the dynamic estimation and related counterfactual experiments.
The remaining question is: how sensitive are our results to the level of time dummy intercept
in the revenue function which captures the general equilibrium effect? Without the hassle of
explicitly extending the model to include general equilibrium condition, I perform two sets of
experiments to shed light on this question. In the first set, I use the maximum of the estimated
time dummies as the intercept of revenue function and recalculate the (1) gains from import, (2)
gains from reduction of sunk and fixed costs of import, and (3) gains from tariff reduction. In the
second set, I use the minimum of the estimated time dummies instead. The results are reported
in Table A4-A6. The predictions of (1)-(3) in these experiments are very close to those in the full
model, in which the mean of the estimated time dummies is used as the revenue intercept.
8 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of importing intermediate inputs on firm value and productiv-
ity, by estimating a dynamic model of endogenous importing decisions with random sunk and
fixed costs of importing. This dynamic structural model allows me to empirically quantify the
total gains from importing intermediate inputs, to separate the static and dynamic gains from
importing, and to quantify the effect of import liberalization on firm value.
Empirical results using Colombian plant-level data show that importing increases both the within-
plant current period revenue (static effect) and future productivity (dynamic effect) substantially,
and that more productive plants with low importing costs tend to import intermediate input-
s. Counterfactual analysis shows that, compared with the autarky economy, importing access
in the Colombian data increases within-plant firm value substantially, which is defined as the
accumulated future profit combining both static and dynamic effects. In the four industries we
investigated, importing access improves firm value by 11.92-23.79% compared with autarky. It
is also shown that both effects, the static effect via improved quality and variety of imported
intermediate inputs and dynamic effect through productivity gain, are important sources of gains
from importing. In these four industries, the dynamic effect alone increases within-firm value by
1.89-18.41%, which accounts for about 15% - 89% of the total gains from importing. It is also
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shown that import liberalization, either through reduction of sunk and fixed costs of importing or
tariff reduction, affects firm value significantly by changing firms’ endogenous importing choices.
These results have important implications for trade policies.
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Appendices
A Algorithm to Evaluate V 1(sjt) and V
0(sjt)
Given all parameters in the production function, productivity evolution process, and demand
elasticity, we are going to estimate the parameters governing the distribution of fixed and sunk
costs in the dynamic model. This appendix summarizes the algorithm.
1. Pick a starting parameter
(
λ0s, λ
0
f
)
∈ Λ.
2. Discretize the state space S into S. I choose 25 grids for productivity and capital, respectively.
Then the total number of grids is N = 2 ∗ 25 ∗ 25 = 1250 due to the discrete importing status in
the state.
3. Given
(
λ0s, λ
0
f
)
, solve firms’ dynamic importing problem and compute the value function
V (s|λ0s, λ0f ) defined in equation (7), for each discretized state in s ∈ S.
The algorithm to compute V (S|λ0s, λ0f ) is as follows:
3.1: Pick a starting value function V0(S).
3.2: Compute the choice-specific value function V 1(S) and V 0(S) from equations (8), and (9),
where F (wjt+1 | ωjt,djt) is derived from the productivity evolution process, and γjt is assumed
to be constant over time for simplicity since the panel is short. The integration is taken using
numerical methods (quadrature).
3.3: Use pi(S), V 1(S) and V 0(S) to update the value function to V1(S) using Eq. (7). Given
the exponential distribution of sunk and fixed costs of importing, I can integrate out the fixed
and sunk costs as a closed-form solution.
3.4: if |V1(S)− V0(S)| ≥ 10−6, go back to step 3.2.
Iterate until | Vi+1(S)− Vi(S) | is small enough, so that Vi(S) converges to firm value V (S).
This finishes computing the value function in the discretized state space S. Note that all the
values on the grid points are solved out point by point.
4. We then use cubic spline to construct the value for each data point given parameter
(
λ0s, λ
0
f
)
,
V (data|λ0s, λ0f ). With the value function and the assumption on the distribution of Cfjt and Csjt
in hand, we can write down the likelihood functions for the data sample as a function of the
observed data and
(
λ0s, λ
0
f
)
: L(data|λ0s, λ0f ).
5. Search over all the points in the parameter space Λ (or use other optimization algorithms).
Pick (λs, λf )
∗ = arg max(λs,λf )∈Λ L(data|λ0s, λ0f ) as the estimates of the dynamic parameters.
The firm’s importing policy function, firm value (V (S) in this appendix, or V (sjt) in Eq. 7), and
choice-specific firm value (V 1(S) and V 0(S) in this appendix, or V 1(sjt) and V
0(sjt) in Eq. 7)
are all estimated simultaneously in the estimation process.
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Table 1: summary statistics of major variables1
Industry sample import import mean cond. mean
size % obs. % value mat dom mat imp
pharmaceuticals 1793 .7156 .6282 16.1295 38.0794
(29.7772) (67.4765)
printing and publishing 5355 .2409 .3616 8.2753 19.4701
(39.6131) (61.9517)
structural metal products 2373 .2137 .2795 5.7449 10.4289
(10.8392) (38.6984)
other metal products 2643 .3806 .3001 17.3018 19.4869
(38.8004) (37.5404)
all industries 12164 .3359 .4271 10.9009 24.1968
(34.5315) (57.1717)
Industry cond. mean mean mean mean mean
mat dom capital workers investment revenue
pharmaceuticals 20.9560 11.6699 101.0907 2.7696 98.7252
(33.6559) (24.2421) (125.8369) (9.5916) (169.8494)
printing and publishing 22.90628 7.8736 57.2537 1.9453 29.7446
(77.4560) (33.2278) (146.2721) (10.9116) (126.9475)
structural metal products 10.6871 3.7963 40.5129 1.10125 17.4987
(16.7525) (19.5289) (88.9391) (9.2125) (57.8258)
other metal products 30.7325 7.4719 64.2513 1.7866 44.6487
(54.1518) (15.6685) (81.7571) (6.0336) (90.9752)
all industries 22.7045 7.5517 61.9815 1.8677 40.7628
(55.1254) (26.5677) (122.8011) (9.5215) (120.2148)
1 All values are calculated in million of 1977 Colombian Peso. Standard deviations, when nec-
essary, are reported in parentheses. Conditional mean of imported material (“cond. mean
mat imp”) and conditional mean of domestic material (“cond. mean mat dom”) are calculat-
ed as the simple average of expenditure spent on imported material and domestic material,
respectively, by plants that import positive amount of material inputs.
Table 2: transition probability of importing status
djt−1 = 0 djt−1 = 1
Industry djt = 0 djt = 1 djt = 0 djt = 1
pharmaceuticals .9082 .0918 .0457 .9543
printing and publishing .9642 .0358 .1440 .8560
structural metal products .9579 .0421 .1782 .8218
other metal products .9330 .0670 .1164 .8834
all industries .9527 .0473 .1105 .8895
1 The first observation of each firm in the data was excluded, be-
cause we do not observe their lagged importing status before the
first observation.
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Table 3: labor productivity for importers and non-importers1
for importers for non-importers
Industry mean standard variation mean standard variation
pharmaceuticals .8235 .9852 .3278 .2642
printing and publishing .4429 .4679 .2451 .2022
structural metal products .5251 .7265 .3142 .4821
other metal products .7116 .6418 .3746 .5834
all industries .6387 .7524 .2924 .3874
1 Labor productivity is defined as revenue per worker, in which revenue is in million
of 1977 Colombian Peso.
Table 4: estimates of production function parameters
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
α` 0.2543 0.4360 0.3154 0.2840
(0.0456)1 (0.0393) (0.0289) (0.0271)
αm 0.6480 0.5414 0.6032 0.6519
(0.0312) (0.0274) (0.0258) (0.0140)
αk 0.0828 0.0650 0.0778 0.0623
(0.0068) (0.0040) (0.0062) (0.0020)
A 1.0281 1.0060 1.1606 1.1207
(0.1780) (0.1368) (0.2417) (0.0794)
θ−1
θ
0.7491 0.7144 0.9091 0.8888
(0.1791) (0.1160) (0.2607) (0.1448)
1 Standard errors are reported in parentheses. I will keep this rule
throughout the paper unless otherwise specified.
Table 5: estimates of productivity evolution parameters and
demand elasticity
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
Panel A: basic model
g0 0.1936 0.2042 0.4149 0.2217
(0.0381) (0.0289) (0.0632) (0.0322)
gω 0.9132 0.9221 0.8223 0.9016
(0.0178) (0.0114) (0.0269) (0.0147)
gd 0.0160 0.0097 0.0589 0.0126
(0.0054) (0.0028) (0.0083) (0.0032)
σω 0.0636 0.0547 0.0669 0.0484
Panel B: control for export
g0 0.3090 0.2338 0.4221 0.2348
(0.0453) (0.0318) (0.0649) (0.0335)
gω 0.8676 0.9099 0.8193 0.8960
(0.0202) (0.0127) (0.0276) (0.0152)
gd 0.0109 0.0054 0.0580 0.0127
(0.0058) (0.0021) (0.0085) (0.0033)
ge 0.0229 0.0111 0.0085 0.0037
(0.0048) (0.0040) (0.0162) (0.0030)
σω 0.0712 0.0619 0.0757 0.0534
Panel C: demand elasticity
η -3.3001 -2.7001 -3.7399 -4.2012
(0.0039) (0.0025) (0.0130) (0.0030)
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Table 6: implied revenue function parameters: sources of
static gains
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
rw 1.6948 1.5999 2.0576 2.4859
(0.0659)1 (0.0657) (0.0561) (0.0428)
rk 0.1556 0.1063 0.1744 0.1655
(0.0082) (0.0057) (0.0089) (0.0095)
rd 0.2998 0.2482 0.2247 0.2705
(0.0510) (0.0134) (0.0618) (0.0131)
1 The standard errors are constructed using 200 simulations based
on estimates of production function parameters.
Table 7: distribution of sunk and fixed cost (MLE)
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
λs 12.6312 12.1724 13.7615 12.7460
(0.2433) (0.1482) (0.2483) (0.1508)
λf 9.3439 8.0794 9.7302 9.5005
(0.0376) (0.0214) (0.0281) (0.0250)
obj.fun 155.5258 430.8441 155.2375 313.6812
Table 8: total gains from importing (in millions of 1977 Pesos)
Industry V (sjt) V (ωjt, kjt) Total Gain Total Gain(%)
1
pharmaceuticals 844.5119 643.6179 200.8938 23.79%
printing and publishing 207.7018 182.9481 24.7537 11.92%
structural metal products 403.6704 320.3828 83.2876 20.63%
other metal products 599.1136 476.9495 122.1641 20.39%
1 It is defined as the ratio of total gains divided by original firm value.
Table 9: dynamic and static gains from importing (in millions of 1977 Pesos)
Dynamic Effect Static Effect Total Gain
Industry Value Value(%)1 Value Value(%)1
pharmaceuticals 50.0646 5.93% 150.8292 17.86% 200.8938
printing and publishing 3.9237 1.89% 20.8300 10.03% 24.7537
structural metal products 74.3358 18.41% 8.9518 2.22% 83.2876
other metal products 54.4141 9.08% 67.7500 11.31% 122.1641
1 They are defined as the ratio of gains from each effect to the original firm value.
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Table 10: counterfactual import liberalization/protection
and firm value—when policy changes both sunk and fixed
costs
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
Panel A:
-5% 0.33% 0.35% 0.73% 0.51%
-10% 0.67% 0.72% 1.49% 1.02%
-25% 1.70% 1.95% 4.09% 2.68%
-50% 3.53% 4.56% 9.91% 5.83%
Panel B:
+5% -0.33% -0.34% -0.69% -0.49%
+10% -0.65% -0.66% -1.34% -0.97%
+25% -1.61% -1.55% -3.13% -2.34%
+50% -3.14% -2.84% -5.67% -4.42%
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Table 11: counterfactual import liberalization/protection
and firm value—when policy changes sunk and fixed costs
separately
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
Part I: when policy changes fixed cost only
Panel A:
-5% 0.26% 0.16% 0.39% 0.33%
-10% 0.52% 0.32% 0.78% 0.66%
-25% 1.30% 0.81% 1.95% 1.65%
-50% 2.61% 1.63% 3.96% 3.33%
Panel B:
+5% -0.26% -0.16% -0.39% -0.33%
+10% -0.52% -0.32% -0.77% -0.65%
+25% -1.30% -0.79% -1.90% -1.61%
+50% -2.58% -1.57% -3.74% -3.16%
Part II: when policy changes sunk cost only
Panel A:
-5% 0.07% 0.19% 0.33% 0.18%
-10% 0.15% 0.39% 0.69% 0.36%
-25% 0.39% 1.09% 1.96% 0.97%
-50% 0.86% 2.67% 5.06% 2.25%
Panel B:
+5% -0.07% -0.18% -0.31% -0.17%
+10% -0.13% -0.35% -0.60% -0.33%
+25% -0.32% -0.80% -1.35% -0.76%
+50% -0.59% -1.41% -2.34% -1.38%
Part III: ratio of the effects: fixed to sunk
Panel A:
-5% 3.71 0.85 1.16 1.88
-10% 3.47 0.82 1.12 1.82
-25% 3.33 0.74 1.00 1.70
-50% 3.03 0.61 0.78 1.48
Panel B:
+5% 3.71 0.89 1.25 1.95
+10% 4.00 0.92 1.29 1.99
+25% 4.06 0.99 1.41 2.11
+50% 4.37 1.12 1.60 2.29
1 The ratio of effects are defined as the ratio of gains from changing
fixed costs (in Part I) to that from changing sunk costs (in Part
II), given that the sunk and fixed costs are changed by the same
percentage in these two separate counterfactual experiments.
Table 12: counterfactual tariff reduction and firm value
tariff pharma- printing and structural other metal
reduction ceuticals publishing metal products products
-5% 0.63% 0.96% 2.81% 2.65%
-10% 1.34% 2.06% 6.20% 5.83%
-15% 2.13% 3.32% 10.23% 9.57%
-17% 2.48% 3.88% 12.04% 11.24%
-20% 3.02% 4.78% 14.98% 13.93%
-25% 4.02% 6.45% 20.52% 18.94%
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Table A1: estimates of productivity evolution parameters
using import expenditure share1 (robustness check)
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
Panel A: basic model2
g0 0.2442 0.2065 0.3167 0.1835
(0.0458) (0.0318) (0.0585) (0.0285)
gω 0.8946 0.9213 0.8648 0.9186
(0.0202) (0.0127) (0.0249) (0.0132)
gd 0.0300 0.0123 0.0751 0.0111
(0.0096) (0.0045) (0.0161) (0.0042)
σω 0.0635 0.0547 0.0682 0.0492
Panel B: control for export
g0 0.3069 0.2235 0.3263 0.2060
(0.0454) (0.0320) (0.0596) (0.0313)
gω 0.8706 0.9154 0.8608 0.9089
(0.0197) (0.0126) (0.0254) (0.0143)
gd 0.0143 0.0132 0.0705 0.0106
(0.0096) (0.0048) (0.0173) (0.0041)
ge 0.0213 0.0139 0.0158 0.0054
(0.0051) (0.0035) (0.0181) (0.0030)
σω 0.0720 0.0613 0.0728 0.0527
1 As a robustness check, in this table the import expenditure share is
used to capture the productivity effect of importing in the productivity
evolution process. A positive and significant effect of importing on
productivity is also found, as that in Table 5 when importing dummy
is used.
2 Panel A: baseline model, ωjt = g0 + gωωjt−1 + gdshdjt−1 + ξjt. Pan-
el B: extended model controlling for export, ωjt = g0 + gωωjt−1 +
gdshdjt−1 + geejt−1 + ξjt. Here shdjt−1 is the expenditure share of
imported intermediate inputs in total expenditure on intermediate in-
puts.
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Table A2: estimates of model parameters for a subsample
of non-exporters (robustness check)
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
Panel A: production parameter
α` 0.2818 0.4491 0.2939 0.2708
(0.0526) (0.0465) (0.0337) (0.0331)
αm 0.6390 0.5353 0.6294 0.6503
(0.0256) (0.0292) (0.0182) (0.0164)
αk 0.0791 0.0478 0.0754 0.0608
(0.0086) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0077)
A 1.1425 1.0968 1.2397 1.1709
(0.1833) (0.1829) (0.3043) (0.1132)
θ−1
θ
0.9608 0.7878 0.9705 0.9260
(0.3579) (0.1747) (0.3363) (0.1803)
Panel B: productivity evolution
g0 0.4084 0.3804 0.2973 0.2008
(0.0848) (0.0377) (0.0542) (0.0460)
gω 0.8207 0.8588 0.8638 0.9133
(0.0378) (0.0148) (0.0244) (0.0199)
gd 0.0411 0.0134 0.0458 0.0086
(0.0069) (0.0047) (0.0072) (0.0039)
σω 0.0756 0.0632 0.0509 0.0565
Panel C: demand elasticity
η -3.0490 -2.1601 -3.3156 -5.3632
(0.0053) (0.0022) (0.0052) (0.0039)
Panel D: implied revenue parameter
rw 1.6232 1.1217 1.8156 2.9902
(0.0623)1 (0.0629) (0.0473) (0.0632)
rk 0.1413 0.0537 0.1503 0.2080
(0.0133) (0.0068) (0.0062) (0.0133)
rd 0.1518 0.1444 0.2658 0.3550
(0.1062) (0.0222) (0.2257) (0.0354)
Panel E: distribution of fixed/sunk costs
λs 11.7420 11.2287 13.1125 12.8337
(0.2398) (0.1827) (0.2513) (0.1802)
λf 8.6417 7.0195 9.1759 9.7160
(0.0338) (0.0218) (0.0329) (0.0367)
obj.fun 143.3992 355.6616 143.1515 247.0329
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Table A3: estimates of static parameters without control-
ling for age and ownership in φ(·) (robustness check)
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
Panel A: production parameter
α` 0.2691 0.4585 0.2820 0.3001
(0.0413) (0.0337) (0.0299) (0.0238)
αm 0.6588 0.5227 0.6358 0.6580
(0.0295) (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0137)
αk 0.0791 0.0478 0.0754 0.0608
(0.0086) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0077)
A 1.0324 1.0093 0.9905 1.0605
(0.1665) (0.1303) (0.2203) (0.0829)
θ−1
θ
0.7672 0.7642 0.6891 0.8394
(0.0860) (0.0668) (0.0907) (0.1341)
Panel B: productivity evolution
g0 0.3294 0.3975 0.5552 0.4043
(0.0684) (0.0428) (0.0668) (0.0549)
gω 0.8456 0.8500 0.7346 0.8119
(0.0335) (0.0169) (0.0302) (0.0275)
gd 0.0138 0.0137 0.0153 0.0125
(0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0050) (0.0028)
ge 0.0150 0.0126 0.0104 0.0059
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0110) (0.0030)
σω 0.0674 0.0659 0.0754 0.0519
Panel C: demand elasticity
η -3.1036 -2.6821 -3.7478 -3.9106
(0.0039) (0.0025) (0.0130) (0.0030)
Panel D: implied revenue parameter
rw 1.6948 1.5998 2.0576 2.4859
(0.0593)1 (0.0574) (0.0451) (0.0380)
rk 0.1689 0.1103 0.1986 0.1589
(0.0089) (0.0056) (0.0076) (0.0075)
rd 0.2728 0.1862 0.2338 0.2804
(0.0084) (0.0046) (0.0166) (0.0106)
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Table A4: Sensitivity of Predicted Gains from Importing to
Revenue Intercept Time Dummy
Industry gains main results max min1
pharmaceuticals total 23.79% 24.45% 22.44%
static 17.86% 18.53% 16.50%
dynamic 5.93% 5.92% 5.94%
printing and publishing total 11.29% 12.52% 11.16%
static 10.03% 10.58% 9.34%
dynamic 1.89% 1.94% 1.83%
structural metal products total 20.63% 23.05% 17.24%
static 2.22% 3.05% 1.31%
dynamic 18.41% 19.99% 15.93%
other metal products total 20.39% 21.52% 18.58%
static 11.31% 12.28% 9.77%
dynamic 9.08% 9.23% 8.80%
1 The last two columns, respectively, report the model predicted gains
from import when the time dummy (i.e. the intercept of revenue func-
tion) equals the upper bound and lower bound of the estimates of time
dummies.
Table A5: Sensitivity of Predicted Gains from Sunk and Fixed Costs Reduc-
tion to Revenue Intercept Time Dummy
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
Panel A:
max1 min max min max min max min
-5% 0.30% 0.41% 0.35% 0.36% 0.71% 0.75% 0.46% 0.57%
-10% 0.59% 0.82% 0.71% 0.74% 1.46% 1.54% 0.94% 1.15%
-25% 1.51% 2.08% 1.91% 2.00% 4.00% 4.21% 2.45% 3.03%
-50% 3.13% 4.33% 4.45% 4.69% 9.61% 10.24% 5.31% 6.64%
Panel B:
max min max min max min max min
+5% -0.29% -0.40% -0.33% -0.34% -0.67% -0.71% -0.45% -0.55%
+10% -0.58% -0.80% -0.65% -0.67% -1.32% -1.38% -0.89% -1.09%
+25% -1.43% -1.96% -1.53% -1.58% -3.07% -3.23% -2.16% -2.61%
+50% -2.80% -3.82% -2.80% -2.89% -5.56% -5.84% -4.09% -4.90%
1 The “max” columns reports the policy effects when the intercept of revenue function is
chosen to be the maximum of the time dummies among all years. The “min” columns
reports the policy effects when the intercept of revenue function is chosen to be the
maximum of the time dummies among all years.
Table A6: Sensitivity of Predicted Gains from Tariff Reduction to Rev-
enue Intercept Time Dummy
pharma- printing and structural other metal
Industry ceuticals publishing metal products products
max min max min max min max min
-5% 0.75% 0.68% 1.04% 0.85% 3.16% 2.33% 2.79% 2.49%
-10% 1.57% 1.45% 2.23% 1.82% 6.93% 5.17% 6.12% 5.52%
-15% 2.50% 2.31% 3.59% 2.95% 11.39% 8.60% 10.02% 9.12%
-17% 2.91% 2.68% 4.20% 3.45% 13.38% 10.15% 11.75% 10.73%
-20% 3.54% 3.28% 5.21% 4.25% 16.59% 12.68% 14.54% 13.33%
-25% 4.72% 4.37% 7.10% 5.77% 22.63% 17.50% 19.73% 18.22%
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Figure 1: labor productivity and importing history
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Note: This figure shows the mean of labor productivity, defined as the mean of revenue per worker, for different
groups of observations. The groups are defined as follows:
group 1: observations of firms that never import in the data;
group 2: observations just one year before the firm starts importing;
group 3: observations of first-year importing;
group 4-6: observations of 2nd-4th year of importing, respectively;
group 7: observations that were importing for N ≥ 5 years;
group 8: observations of the first year after the firm quits importing;
group 9: observations of N ≥ 2 years after the firm quits importing.
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Figure 2: Importing and simulated expected productivity for 30 years
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Note: This table simulates the expected productivity for 30 years, for firms that always import and that never. The
rows corresponds to the four industries. The columns correspond to different starting productivity, with the left
starting from the 10%-quintile productivity of that industry and the right column starting from the 90%-quintile.
This figure suggests importing not only improves the productivity growth rate during the transition process, but
also increases the steady-state productivity level.
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Figure 3: productivity, costs, and importing decision
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Note: the sunk and fixed costs are calculated in million of 1977 Colombia Peso. The left column referents the
importing decisions for firms which did not import and the right column refers to that for firms which were already
importing. They correspond to equations (20) and (21), respectively.
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Figure 4: Distribution of firm value in the data, in autarky, and in the case without dynamic
gains (firm value in million 1977 Colombia Peso)
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Figure 5: Distribution of firm value when increasing sunk/fixed costs by 25% and 50% (firm value
in million 1977 Colombia Peso)
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Figure 6: Distribution of firm value when decreasing sunk/fixed costs by 25% and 50% (firm
value in million 1977 Colombia Peso)
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